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ARMED TO THE TEETH: THE USE OF A PERSON’S MOUTH, 
TEETH OR BODY AS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT FOR 
AGGRAVATED OFFENSES 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Plunkett1 
(decided June 7, 2012) 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant David Plunkett has a history of mental illness and 
is a carrier of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).2  During a 
visit to his primary care physician, he was found by police openly 
possessing marijuana and acting strangely in the waiting room.3  This 
behavior prompted the police to arrest Plunkett.4  Plunkett resisted 
the arrest and bit the police officer on the finger.5  As a result, Plun-
kett was charged and convicted of aggravated assault upon a police 
officer.6 
Three elements must be satisfied to sustain a conviction for 
aggravated assault under New York Penal Law § 120.11.  A prima 
facie case requires: (1) “intent to cause serious physical injury”, (2) 
“to a person whom he knows or reasonably should reasonably know 
to be a police officer or a peace officer engaged in the course of per-
forming his official duties”, and (3) an injury caused by means of a 
“deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.”7  In New York, a “serious 
physical injury” is one that “creates a substantial risk of death, or 
which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protract-
ed impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the func-
 
1 971 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 2012). 
2 Id. at 364. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d at 364; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.11 (McKinney 1993). 
7 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.11 (McKinney 1993). 
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tion of any bodily organ.”8  A “dangerous instrument” is defined as 
“any instrument, article or substance, including a ‘vehicle’ as that 
term is defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in 
which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is 
readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.”9 
The county court did not address the first two elements of the 
aggravated assault charge upon a police officer or peace officer.10  To 
establish the third element, the People specified in Plunkett’s indict-
ment that the dangerous instrument used by the defendant was his 
teeth.11  Defense counsel challenged the charge on the premise that 
Plunkett’s teeth cannot be considered a dangerous instrument within 
the meaning of the Penal Law.12  The county court agreed, citing 
precedent that teeth are not a dangerous instrument.13  However, the 
court concluded that Plunkett’s AIDS infected saliva was a dangerous 
instrument, and the bite by the defendant’s teeth was a vehicle to 
transmit the virus.14  Plunkett was induced to plea to the top three 
counts of the indictment and the county court granted the right to ap-
peal recognizing that complicated legal issues were at stake.15  The 
Appellate Division affirmed the county court’s judgment, reasoning 
that the previous plea resulted in a forfeiture of any appellate 
claims.16  The Court of Appeals subsequently rejected the county 
court’s determination that the saliva of a person infected with the 
AIDS virus constituted a dangerous instrument.17  The Appellate Di-
vision’s order was modified, the count of aggravated assault was 
dismissed, and the case was remanded for resentencing.18 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PLUNKETT 
Absent from the court’s opinion in Plunkett was any discus-
 
8 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (10) (McKinney 2008). 
9 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (13) (McKinney 2008). 
10 Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d 363.  There was no dispute that there was an assault on a police 
officer or peace officer.  Id. 
11 Id. at 364. 
12 Id.; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (13). 
13 Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d at 365. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 366. 
17 Id. at 368. 
18 Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d at 368. 
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sion pertaining to the constitutionality of New York Penal Law § 
120.11.  Paramount to any of the concerns mentioned by the court is 
the necessity that the statute provides fair notice of its meaning to a 
person of common intelligence.19  If the words or meaning of a crim-
inal statute are vague or ambiguous, it may run afoul of a person’s 
due process rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.20  A 
statute must be sufficiently explicit so that a reasonable person knows 
what behavior it is intended to permit or prohibit.21 The statute must 
provide a criminal defendant fair notice of the “manner, time and 
place of the conduct underlying the accusations, so as to enable him 
to answer the charges and prepare an adequate defense.”22 
It is not the duty of the United States Supreme Court to inter-
pret state statutes; states must take appropriate action in drafting and 
interpreting their statutes to protect them from subsequently being 
declared unconstitutional.23  Along with the fair notice requirement, 
the language must not “permit or encourage arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement.”24  Additionally, a “deprivation of the right of fair 
warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also 
from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow 
and precise statutory language.”25 
III. “A BITE OUT OF THE BIG APPLE” - NEW YORK’S 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
The court in Plunkett was faced with a basic legal question, 
but one that has been met with controversy and varied approaches 
throughout the courts of the United States: whether part of a person’s 
anatomy can be considered a “deadly weapon” or a “dangerous in-
 
19 Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating that “a statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first 
essential of due process of law”). 
20 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (protecting the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (same). 
21 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964). 
22 People v. Evangelista, 771 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (Crim. Ct. 2003); People v. Keindl, 502 
N.E.2d 577,  579 (N.Y. 1986). 
23 People ex rel. Serra v. Warden, Rikers Island Men’s House of Det., 395 N.Y.S.2d 602, 
607 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
24 People v. Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (N.Y. 1988). 
25 Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352. 
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strument” for the purposes of sustaining aggravated offenses.26  In 
order to resolve this matter, the court carefully interpreted “dangerous 
instruments” within the meaning of the Penal Law and applicable le-
gal precedent.27 
It is well-established in New York State that a person’s body 
parts alone are not deadly weapons or dangerous instruments capable 
of satisfying the elements of an aggravating offense.28  There are im-
portant policy concerns underlying the courts’ unwillingness to allow 
the human anatomy to fall within the definition of a dangerous in-
strument.29  One major concern is the imposition of liability on the 
“extraordinary man,” whose physical attributes may be superior to 
that of the “ordinary man.”30  By virtue of this distinction, the New 
York Court of Appeals has explained that due to the physical build of 
the “extraordinary man,” he would face heightened charges every 
time he merely threatened another with bodily assault.31  Factors such 
as “the size of the perpetrator, his weight, strength, etc., as well as 
any infirmities or frailties of the victim would all be relevant in un-
derstanding one’s ability to cause serious physical injury or death.”32  
Hence, the “extraordinary man” would be penalized more harshly 
than the “ordinary man” for the same offense, even if the extent of 
the injury was identical.33 
The court also expressed concern that if the human anatomy 
could be considered a dangerous weapon, statutory liability for as-
saults would be blurred beyond distinction.34  For example, if the “ex-
traordinary man” were to get into a fistfight with another person, it 
would blur the statutory line between simple assault and assault with 
a dangerous instrument, regardless of the severity of the victim’s in-
jury.35  The ordinary meaning of the term “dangerous instrument” has 
 
26 Plunkett, 971 N.E.2d at 368. 
27 Id.; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (13). 
28 See generally People v. Austin, 516 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1987) (“The use 
by the average layperson of the hand to strike a blow is insufficient proof of assault in the 
second degree.”). 
29 See generally People v. Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1999). 
30 Id. at 1231. 
31 Id.  (reasoning that a heavyweight boxer would be subject to liability each time he was 
competing in a match); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (13) (highlighting the fact that the 
definition includes the mere threatened use of a dangerous instrument). 
32 Id. at 1232. 
33 Id. (arguing against a “sliding scale of criminal liability”). 
34 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1232. 
35 Id. 
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consistently been interpreted to exclude “one’s arm, hand, teeth, el-
bow or [ ] other body part.”36  The statute is interpreted to increase 
criminal liability only when the “actor has upped the ante by employ-
ing a device to assist in the criminal endeavor.”37 
Under this line of reasoning, the New York courts have de-
termined that body parts that are “covered with apparel or objects . . . 
aggravate their use” and change the nature of the body part within the 
meaning of the Penal Code.38  This type of addition or modification 
enhances the potential for serious injury in a way that justifies a 
heightened degree of criminal liability.39  In People v. Carter,40 the 
court observed that New York courts have historically adopted the 
use-oriented approach to determine whether an object can be consid-
ered a dangerous instrument.41  This approach emphasizes how the 
“instrument, article or substance” is used in relation to an aggravated 
offense, rather than how “innocuous [the item] may appear to be 
when used for its legitimate purpose.”42  Instead of declaring whether 
an item is dangerous per se, the courts have traditionally let the jury 
decide whether the evidence presented on a case by case basis sup-
ports a finding that an inherently innocuous item has been rendered a 
dangerous instrument by its usage under the circumstances.43  By uti-
lizing this approach, courts have found a multitude of normally in-
nocuous items to qualify as dangerous instruments when used to in-
flict injury or enhance the severity of injury upon another person.44 
 
36 Id. at 1233. 
37 Id. 
38 People v. Johnson, 504 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1986). 
39 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1232. 
40 People v. Carter, 423 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1981). 
41 Id. at 32. 
42 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1229-30; see also Carter, 423 N.E.2d 30, 32 (reasoning that a 
person could wear a pair of rubber boots without being considered to be armed with a dan-
gerous weapon within the meaning of the Penal Law, but if the boots were used in a manner 
that “renders [them] readily capable of causing serious physical injury” then they would be-
come a dangerous instrument). 
43 Carter, 423 N.E.2d at 32; see also People v. Cwikla, 400 N.Y.S.2d 35, 43 (App. Div. 
1st Dep’t 1977), rev’d on other grounds, People v. Cwikla, 386 N.E.2d 1070 (N.Y. 1979) 
(concluding that a handkerchief used as a gag could be considered a dangerous instrument). 
44 See People v. Curtis, 679 N.E.2d 634 (N.Y. 1997) (involving a belt); People v. Galvin, 
481 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 1985) (involving a sidewalk); People v. Adamkiewicz, 81 N.E.2d 76 
(N.Y. 1948) (involving an ice pick); People v. Mason, 922 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 2011) (involving a letter opener); People v. Lev, 822 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep’t 2006) (involving thick-soled sneakers); People v. Edwards, 792 N.Y.S.2d 394 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 2005) (involving a shoe); People v. Ray, 710 N.Y.S.2d 138 (App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 2000) (involving work boots); People v. Austin, 516 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2d 
5
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In the seminal case of People v. Owusu,45 under a set of facts 
similar to those presented in Plunkett, the Court of Appeals explored 
the plain meaning of the term “dangerous instrument,” legislative his-
tory and judicial precedent to determine whether only external ob-
jects were meant to be included within its definition.46  In Owusu, the 
defendant entered into a physical altercation with another man and bit 
the man on his finger so severely as to sever the nerves.47  The su-
preme court dismissed three counts, including the second degree as-
sault charge, on the premise that the defendant’s teeth could not be 
considered a dangerous instrument.48  The Appellate Division re-
versed the lower court’s decision and applied the use-oriented ap-
proach.49  The Court of Appeals rejected the People’s assertion that 
“the meaning of ‘dangerous instrument’ should be subject to case-by-
case functional inquiries into the use of instruments, articles or sub-
stances.”50  Citing past legislative history and commentary, the court 
concluded that the legislature intended to limit the meaning of a 
“dangerous instrument” to external objects only.51  As a result, the 
majority held as a matter of law that a person’s body parts alone can-
not qualify as a dangerous instrument.52 
Justice Bellacosa, dissenting, criticized the majority’s flat re-
fusal to recognize that the human body may be used as a dangerous 
instrument in some circumstances.53  He criticized the majority for 
effectively taking a powerful leveraging tool away from prosecu-
tors.54  He emphasized that the statute contained no explicit language 
 
Dep’t 1987) (stating that if a chair was used to attack another person it would be a dangerous 
instrument); People v. Davis, 466 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1983) (involving an 
arm cast); People v. Bouldin, 338 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1972) (involving a 
spatula). 
45 712 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1999). 
46 Id.; see generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (13) (McKinney 2011). 
47 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1229. 
48 People v. Owusu, 659 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1997), rev’d, 669 N.Y.S.2d 366 
(App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1998), rev'd, 93 N.Y.2d 398, 712 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1999). 
49 People v. Owusu, 669 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1998), rev'd, 712 N.E.2d 
1228 (N.Y. 1999). 
50 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1230. 
51 Id. at 1231; see 1937 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm’n, at 728 (stating that killing 
“with bare fists cannot be said to be effecting death with a ‘dangerous weapon,’ ” but a fatal 
shooting would be as a matter of law). 
52 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1233. 
53 Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (stating that it is the petit jury’s duty to differentiate 
whether someone used their body as a dangerous criminal instrument). 
54 Id. 
6
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that would prevent the human body from being considered a danger-
ous instrument, and urged that the controlling definition must include 
“[a]nything that can be used to cause death or serious injury.”55  The 
Justice recognized that “the human body and its parts are indisputably 
‘tangible’ ” and could certainly be read into the court’s statutory in-
terpretation.56  He questioned the majority’s reliance on the “extraor-
dinary man” analogy with a rebuttal that the teeth of an “ordinary 
man” have the potential to inflict serious injury on a larger or strong-
er individual.57  The Justice rejected the majority’s holding, noting 
that a bite with artificial dentures would qualify as a dangerous in-
strument under its holding.58  Although practically identical as far as 
their usage and their potential for harm, the artificial dentures would 
result in increased criminal liability, whereas a bite with regular teeth 
would not.59  He observed that there should not be a line drawn as a 
matter of law.60  Rather, he proposed that a jury is more than capable 
of “distinguishing between a body part used in an ordinary fashion, 
even if it inflicts harm, and one used in a criminal manner so as to 
constitute a ‘dangerous instrument’ that produces serious bodily 
harm.”61 
In People v. Mateo,62 the defendant was convicted of assault 
in the first degree.63  The court found the dangerous instrument to be 
the defendant’s pit bull.64  The pit bull caused “serious and protracted 
disfigurement” to the victim.65  The court left it to the jury to decide 
whether evidence and witness testimony properly established the de-
fendant’s intent.66 
In People v. Byrd,67 the defendant, while wearing hard plastic 
 
55 Id. at 1234. 
56 Id. at 1235. 
57 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1236 (agreeing that a punch from Mike Tyson in a sanctioned 
boxing match could not be actionable, but a bite to Evander Holyfield’s ear could be differ-
entiated); see generally People v. Vollmer, 87 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1949). 
58 Owusu, 712 N.E.2d at 1236 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1237. 
61 Id. 
62 909 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010). 
63 Id. at 266-67. 
64 Id. at 267. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 855 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2008). 
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sandals, repeatedly kicked the victim in the stomach.68  As a result, 
the victim suffered broken ribs and a ruptured pancreas.69  The de-
fendant argued that he could not be charged with aggravated assault 
after the court’s holding in Owusu, “because a body part cannot be a 
dangerous instrument.”70  The court rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment and stated that although a body part cannot be a dangerous in-
strument, the defendant’s sandals had the capability of aggravating 
the injury.71  Thus, depending on its use, a “shod foot” may be a dan-
gerous instrument.72 
In People v. Warren,73 the defendant was charged with assault 
in the second degree after the victim alleged she was thrown down a 
staircase to the concrete below.74  The defendant argued that, under 
the circumstances, he did not use the concrete floor as a dangerous 
instrument.75  The trial court agreed and dismissed that count of the 
indictment.76  On appeal, the count was reinstated, and the court stat-
ed that there was sufficient evidence for a grand jury to satisfy the 
charge.77  The court noted that although there was sufficient evidence 
presented to the grand jury for indictment, the People still have the 
burden to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to use the concrete as a dangerous instrument.78 
IV. THE FEDERAL APPROACH - CONFLICT AMONGST THE 
CIRCUITS 
One of the leading federal court cases that addressed whether 
a person’s anatomy, in particular a person’s mouth and teeth, can be 
considered a deadly and dangerous weapon was the Eighth Circuit 
case of United States v. Moore.79  A doctor informed Moore, an in-
mate at a medical center in Minnesota, that he had tested positive for 
 
68 Id. at 507. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 511. 
71 Id. 
72 Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
73 949 N.Y.S.2d 496 (App. Div. 2d Dept 2012). 
74 Id. at 497. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 499. 
78 Warren, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 499. 
79 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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HIV and that the disease was transmissible via blood or semen.80  
Moore was suspected of smoking in a non-smoking area and a violent 
altercation ensued after he refused to act accordingly during question-
ing.81  A correction officer attempted to restrain Moore and during 
the struggle Moore bit the officer several times, holding each bite for 
five to seven seconds.82  Later, during questioning, Moore remarked 
that he “hope[d] the wounds that he inflicted on the officers when he 
bit them were bad enough that they get the disease that he has.”83 
Moore was charged with assault on federal officers with a 
dangerous weapon, in particular, his mouth and teeth.84  An expert 
testified at the trial that although the medical profession did not rec-
ognize well-proven instances where HIV was transmitted via a hu-
man bite, the virus nonetheless has a miniscule presence in human sa-
liva.85  Additionally, the expert went on to state that aside from the 
presence of HIV, a human bite can be “much more dangerous than a 
dog bite” due to a variety of germs present in the human mouth.86  He 
categorized a human bite as being one of the most “dangerous 
form[s] of aggression” and “one of the most dangerous of all forms of 
bites.”87 
The Eighth Circuit has established that the jury should deter-
mine what constitutes a “deadly and dangerous weapon.”88  It is not 
necessary that the injury cause a “substantial liklihood of death” but 
that the harm must be “more than a minor injury.”89  The court in 
Moore reasoned that it is too difficult to determine as a matter of law 
whether an item can be deadly or dangerous and it must be left to the 
jury to decide whether the usage has rendered an object “deadly and 
dangerous.”90  The court emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not 
 
80 Id. at 1164 (noting that the defendant had also tested positive for hepatitis, but this item 
was not included in the indictment). 
81 Id. at 1165. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Moore, 846 F.2d at 1166. 
85 Id. at 1165. 
86 Id. at 1165-66 (adding that the combination of these germs could lead to serious infec-
tion). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1166; see United States v. Czeck, 671 F.2d 1195, 1197 (8th Cir. 1982). 
89 Moore, 846 F.2d at 1166; see United States v. Webster, 620 F.2d 640, 641-42 (7th Cir. 
1980) (reasoning that legislative definitions should not be read so narrowly as to exclude 
reasonable meanings). 
90 Moore, 846 F.2d at 1166 (emphasizing that almost any object can cause great bodily 
9
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the actual harm that the object caused, but whether the object has the 
“capacity, given the manner of its use” to inflict serious injury.91 
Thus, leaving the question of whether the object or substance 
has the capacity for harm for the jury to decide, the court emphasized 
that the inquiry is not whether the object or substance in its resting 
state should be considered dangerous as a matter of law.92  Although 
Moore did not transfer any germs or diseases he may have held at the 
time of the bite, the fact that he had the capacity to transfer such was 
deemed sufficient to allow the issue to reach the jury.93  Ultimately, 
the court found that the evidence supported a finding that Moore’s 
mouth and teeth were used in a manner that rendered them a danger-
ous weapon.94 
The Fourth Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in United 
States v. Sturgis,95 wherein the defendant was also HIV positive.96  
Sturgis was visiting an inmate at a reformatory and was informed that 
he would be subject to a contraband search before being granted vis-
itation rights.97  A foreign object was discovered during the search 
and Sturgis expressed his desire to terminate the search and cancel 
the visit.98  He reached into his pants and placed an object into his 
mouth which caused the officer to suspect that Sturgis was attempting 
to conceal contraband.99  When the officer attempted to retrieve the 
substance, the defendant reacted violently and bit the officer on the 
finger, pressing down with the bite for several seconds as to cause a 
serious wound with heavy blood flow.100  As other officers arrived to 
restrain Sturgis, he continued to struggle and bit another officer on 
the arm.101  It was suspected that Sturgis had swallowed narcotics, 
and as such, he was transported to a local hospital to be treated.102  
His violent behavior continued at the hospital as he tried to spit and 
 
harm, and whether and when such harm is caused depends on the circumstances). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1167. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1168. 
95 48 F.3d 784 (4th Cir. 1995). 
96 Id. at 785. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 785. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 786. 
10
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bite the medical attendants, and later remarked “I’ll bite you like I did 
her.  I hope you get it,” displaying his intent to infect those around 
him with HIV.103 
The court relied on expert testimony at the trial, citing accept-
ed medical literature, which confirmed that HIV could be transferred 
through a human bite.104  Similar to New York’s statute for assault 
with a dangerous weapon, the federal system also requires three ele-
ments to be proven.105  Particularly, the government must establish 
that (1) there was an assault (2) with a dangerous weapon, (3) and 
there was intent to cause bodily harm.106  The court in Sturgis found 
that the assault element was clear and the intent element was satisfied 
by the statements made by the defendant during the struggle.107  Once 
again, the conviction hinged upon the court’s interpretation of a 
“dangerous weapon.”108  The court’s decision was consistent with the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Moore holding that an object’s innate 
character should not be determinative.109  The object’s use and capac-
ity to threaten life and limb should govern whether an object is dan-
gerous.110  Thus, the court’s interpretation of the statute permitted 
teeth to be construed as “a dangerous weapon if they are employed as 
such.”111  The court observed the lack of any artificial lines in the 
statute’s language that would otherwise prohibit a finding that the 
human body was excluded from consideration.112  Instead, the court 
determined that the jury must ascertain whether the facts as presented 
warrant a particular instrumentality dangerous under the circum-
stances it was used, observing that there was no need to resort to a 
flat determination as a matter of law.113  Through this holding, the 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id.; see HIV Transmission, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/transmission.htm (click “Can HIV be transmitted by 
human bite?”) (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
105 18 U.S.C. § 113 (A) (3) (2006). 
106 Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 786; see 18 U.S.C. § 113 (a) (3) (“Assault with a dangerous weap-
on, with intent to do bodily harm, and without just cause or excuse, by a fine under this title 
or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.”). 
107 Id. at 787. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.; Moore, 846 F.2d 1163; see also United States v. Johnson, 324 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 
1963). 
111 Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 788. 
112 Id. at 788 (stating that any other interpretation would be an “exercise in empty formal-
ism”). 
113 Id.  Here, the court asserts that a jury is more than capable of determining that a body 
11
Costa: Armed to the Teeth
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
936 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
court aimed to protect those injured by these assaults, law enforce-
ment officials in this case, rather than shield the perpetrator from ag-
gravated charges.114 
Justice Hall, in his dissent, took issue with the majority’s lib-
eral interpretation of the statute and inclusion of body parts within the 
its meaning.115  He expressed concern about the blurring of the statu-
tory lines.116  He further remarked that although any object could be 
considered a weapon within the statute, if the legislature intended to 
include body parts, it clearly would have proscribed it in the statutory 
language.117  He interpreted the statute as directing that one must be 
armed with a “weapon,” noting that neither body parts nor stationary 
objects fall within the statute’s ordinary meaning.118 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Rocha,119 resolved a re-
lated question as to whether the use of one’s bare hands can support a 
conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon.120  During a prison 
fight, the defendant used his hands to pull out the legs of the victim, 
causing the victim’s body to crash onto the concrete floor beneath 
him.121  The defendant was charged and convicted with assault with a 
dangerous weapon by the district court.122  The jury concluded that 
the defendant’s hands constituted the dangerous weapon, not the con-
crete floor.123  The defendant appealed, urging that the use of one’s 
bare hands could not satisfy an assault under the federal statute.124 
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the term “dangerous weap-
on” as “any object that is used in a way to inflict great bodily 
harm.”125  In United States v. Riggins,126 the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
 
part was used in a dangerous manner and uses finger nails as an example.  Id.  It has confi-
dence a jury could differentiate between a slap to the face and the use of that same hand’s 
fingernails to claw out the victim's eyes.  Id. 
114 Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 789. 
115 Id. at 790 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 789-90 (stating that it is a strain on the “boundaries of ordinary usage to call 
body parts ‘objects’ ”, and pausing for concern that “[o]nce body parts are deemed weapons, 
the term ceases to be of any use as a distinguishing factor). 
118 Id. at 790-91. 
119 598 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010). 
120 Id. at 1146. 
121 Id. at 1147. 
122 Id. at 1153. 
123 Id. 
124 Rocha, 598 F.3d at 1146; see 18 U.S.C. § 113 (A) (3) (2006). 
125 Rocha, 598 F.3d at 1153; see United States  v. Riggins, 40 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 
1994) (quoting United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1982)) (stating that 
12
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that a shoe and belt were in fact dangerous weapons because each 
was an external item and not part of one’s body.127  These items were 
used to augment physical blows.128  The court concluded that alt-
hough the various parts of the human body are capable of inflicting 
great harm, Congress intended to include only external objects as 
dangerous weapons.129  As such, it held that even though Rocha used 
his hands to trip his victim and caused serious harm, his hands were 
not dangerous weapons, and to decide otherwise would blur statutory 
lines.130 
V. OUT-OF-STATE INTERPRETATIONS OF “DANGEROUS 
INSTRUMENT” AND “DEADLY WEAPON” 
As previously stated, only a minority of jurisdictions recog-
nize that a person’s body, particularly one’s mouth or teeth, when 
used to inflict serious bodily harm upon another, may be considered a 
dangerous instrument for purposes of sustaining aggravated charges.  
The District of Columbia is one jurisdiction that concluded “human 
teeth fit comfortably under the plain meaning of the term dangerous 
weapon.”131  The court addressed the concerns that other courts have 
raised about the blurring of statutory lines in In re D.T.132  In this 
matter, the court determined that a body part may be converted into a 
dangerous weapon depending on the circumstances surrounding the 
assault.133  However, the court further directed that “simply pos-
sessing teeth in no way meets that critical threshold” of being armed 
with a dangerous weapon.134  The court rejected the presumption that 
all persons are armed with dangerous weapons every time they get 
 
determining whether an object is dangerous depends on the manner in which it was used and 
non-obvious items can be deemed dangerous if “used in a manner likely to endanger life or 
inflict great bodily harm”). 
126 40 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1994). 
127 Id. at 1057. 
128 Rocha, 598 F.3d at 1157. 
129 Id.  Here the court joins the majority of jurisdictions in holding that one’s body cannot 
be considered a dangerous instrument.  Id. 
130 Id.  (reasoning that every assault essentially requires the use of some part of the body 
and by holding that a body part could be considered a dangerous weapon would practically 
eliminate simple assault charges and raise every indictment to aggravated assault). 
131 In re D.T., 977 A.2d 346, 355 (D.C. 2009) (noting that the defendant bit a police of-
ficer on his leg, through his pants, as to draw blood and leave bite marks). 
132 977 A.2d 346 (D.C. 2009). 
133 Id. at 354. 
134 Id. 
13
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dressed in the morning and put on their belts and shoes.135  However, 
the court explained that such items can be found dangerous under the 
circumstances.136  Likewise, the court directed that a body part, capa-
ble of satisfying that same criteria, can also be found dangerous under 
the circumstances.137  Under this approach, all simple assaults do not 
automatically convert into assaults with dangerous weapons.138  Ra-
ther, when a body part is used for a secondary purpose, such as in an 
attack, whether the body part was “likely to cause death or great 
bodily injury in the manner in which [they were used],” threatened or 
intended to be used, is a matter reserved for the jury’s determina-
tion.139 
It is well established in the District of Columbia that within 
the meaning of “weapon” is “any instrument of offense; anything 
used, or designed to be used, in attacking an enemy.”140  Human 
teeth, certainly capable of causing severe and dangerous injuries, fall 
well within that definition.141  Even though body parts can be con-
strued as “dangerous” in this jurisdiction, although a stretch, it is 
worth mentioning that human teeth are slightly different than normal 
body parts.142  Human teeth can be removed and are not technically 
“fixed and stationary,” unlike parts of the body such as arms and 
legs.143 
New Mexico shares a similar viewpoint as that of the District 
of Columbia as demonstrated in the case State v. Neatherlin.144  The 
defendant in this case, who had tested positive for hepatitis C, inten-
tionally bit the victim and uttered the words “I hope you die [;] I hope 
you die.”145  An expert at trial noted there is a very small possibility 
(two percent) that hepatitis C can be transmitted through blood or sa-
liva.146  The trial court subsequently convicted the defendant of ag-
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 In re D.T., 977 A.2d at 354. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 350. (quoting Tatum v. United States, 110 F.2d 555, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1940)). 
141 In re D.T., 977 A.2d at 350. 
142 Id. at 352. 
143 Id. 
144 154 P.3d 703, 706 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 707. 
14
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gravated battery with a dangerous weapon.147  The New Mexico 
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, not because a person’s 
mouth cannot be a dangerous weapon, but because the jury was not 
given instructions on the lesser charge of misdemeanor aggravated 
battery.148 
New Mexico courts have concluded that whether, under each 
particular set of circumstances, a body part or normally innocuous 
item was put to use in a manner that is capable of inflicting great bod-
ily harm is a matter reserved for the jury’s determination.149  Specific 
jury instructions are to be given, directing the jury that if the object or 
instrument is used as a weapon and has the potential to cause death or 
serious injury, then it may be considered to satisfy an aggravated of-
fense.150  The courts partially relied on the plain definition of the 
word “weapon” in taking this position, explaining that the plain 
meaning is broad enough to include parts of the body, specifically 
recognizing one’s teeth and mouth.151 
New Mexico focuses on conducting a “functional inquiry into 
the manner of use” to find “an object’s status as a deadly weapon.”152  
In making a determination based off of the actual use of the item, 
New Mexico courts strive to protect the victim rather than the perpe-
trator.153  Thus, by allowing otherwise innocuous items or body parts 
to be considered within the realm of their statutory scheme for aggra-
vated offenses, the court has sought to deter individuals from using 
their mouths to attack others and minimize the potential for injury.154  
As a result, the question of whether a person’s mouth or teeth can be 
used as a deadly weapon in New Mexico is a question of fact for the 
jury to decide and has not been reduced to a matter of law.155 
At one point, Alabama was a state that left open the possibil-
ity that a person’s body could be deemed a dangerous instrument.156  
 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 712-13. 
149 Neatherlin, 154 P.3d at 708. 
150 Id.; NM R CR UJI 14-322 (West 2000). 
151 Neatherlin, 154 P.3d at 709; see Black’s Law Dictionary 1593 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
a weapon as “[a]n instrument of offensive or defensive combat, or anything used, or de-
signed to be used, in destroying, defeating, threatening, or injuring a person”). 
152 Neatherlin, 154 P.3d at 709. 
153 Id.; State v. Vallejos, 9 P.3d 668, 674 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (“The aggravated battery 
statute is directed at preserving the integrity of a person’s body against serious injury.”). 
154 Neatherlin, 154 P.3d at 710. 
155 Id. at 711. 
156 See Brock v. State, 555 So. 2d 285, 287 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that fists could 
15
Costa: Armed to the Teeth
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
940 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
The state has since modified its position on the matter.  In McMillian 
v. State,157 the court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court has con-
cluded “body parts, without more, are not deadly weapons or danger-
ous instruments” within its statutory scheme.158  The court in McMil-
lian acknowledged that normally innocuous objects can be used in a 
matter that render them dangerous or deadly, but refused to include 
the human body in that category of “objects.”159  Under this ap-
proach, the court expressed its concern that the line between the de-
grees of assault would be blurred if the human body could be a dan-
gerous instrument, and pointed to the absence of any basis of 
distinguishment.160  The court observed that the only rational basis 
for increasing the severity of punishment should be when an assailant 
implements an object apart from his own body.161  Any other reason-
ing would confuse the public’s perception of the acceptable standard 
of conduct, diminish necessary fair notice of a crime, and could lead 
to a violation of the defendant’s due process rights.162 
A Massachusetts court arrived at a similar conclusion in 
Commonwealth v. Davis.163  In Davis, the defendant bit off a piece of 
someone’s ear and the trial court jury convicted the defendant of as-
sault with a dangerous weapon.164  The conviction on this charge was 
overturned and the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that “human 
teeth or parts of the body should be excluded from consideration by 
the fact finder as instrumentalities which can be used as dangerous 
weapons.”165  The court explained that the meaning of dangerous 
 
be dangerous instruments or deadly weapons); ALA. CODE § 13A-1-2 (5) (West 1975) (defin-
ing a dangerous instrument as “[a]ny instrument, article, or substance which, under the cir-
cumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is highly ca-
pable of causing death or serious physical injury”). 
157 58 So. 3d 849 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). 
158 Id. at 853; see also Ex parte Cobb, 703 So. 2d 871, 877 (Ala. 1996). 
159 McMillian, 58 So. 3d at 852-53. 
160 Id. at 852; see also Ex parte Cobb, 703 So. 2d at 877 (noting that Alabama’s legisla-
ture adopted their definition of “dangerous instrument” from New York’s Penal Law.  The 
court looks to New York’s rationale as persuasive authority that, without more, the human 
body alone cannot be considered a dangerous weapon). 
161 McMillian, 58 So. 3d at 853.  In this case, the assailant used his mouth and teeth to re-
move the victim’s eyeball causing permanent blindness.  Id.  The court recognizes that this is 
indeed a serious injury but without an external instrumentality there cannot be an aggravated 
charge.  Id. 
162 Id. at 852. 
163 406 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
164 Id. at 418. 
165 Id. at 419. 
16
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weapon as set out by the statute includes two classes of objects: (1) 
objects that are specifically designed to cause death or serious bodily 
injury, and (2) objects that are not inherently dangerous but can be 
put to a use that will inflict serious harm.166  Objects that fall into the 
first category are deemed dangerous as a matter of law, while the 
dangerousness of instrumentalities in the second category are to be 
decided by the fact finder on a case by case basis.167  As such, the 
court directed that any instrumentalities that fall into the second cate-
gory have always been external objects apart from the human 
body.168 
Addressing the concern to protect victims from serious harm, 
the court in Davis pointed to other statutory vehicles enacted to pro-
tect the public without necessitating consideration of the human body 
as a dangerous instrument.169  The court reasoned that the degree of 
harm should not have any relevance in transforming the human body 
into a dangerous instrument.170  In addition, the court advised that it 
was not the legislature’s intent to include body parts in its definition 
of “dangerous weapon,” and any other holding would result in dupli-
cative offenses and frustrate the statutory lines between assaults.171  
The court noted that the jury is more than capable of determining 
whether, based on a particular set of circumstances, a body part was 
used as a dangerous weapon.172  However, the court concluded that to 
enable prosecutors to exploit the system with an excess of felonious 
indictments, would provide them with an unnecessary advantage.173  
The court explained that it was without authority to expand the mean-
ing of a dangerous weapon, as such a task is reserved for the state 
legislature.174  Thus, the court directed that any such changes should 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 419-20 (recognizing that objects that are dangerous per se include firearms and 
knives, while more innocuous items fall under the second category); see also Com. v. Far-
rell, 78 N.E.2d 697 (Mass. 1948) (involving a lighted cigarette); Com. v. LeBlanc, 334 
N.E.2d 647 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (involving an automobile door); Com. v. Tarrant, 314 
N.E.2d 448 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (involving a German shepherd dog). 
168 Davis, 406 N.E.2d at 420. 
169 Id. (stating that when serious physical injury occurs, prosecutors usually bring indict-
ments for mayhem or assault with intent to maim and disfigure, which carry harsher penal-
ties than basic assault or battery indictments). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 421. 
172 Id. at 422. 
173 Davis, 406 N.E.2d at 422. 
174 Id. 
17
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occur through the proper legislative channels.175 
In State v. Bachelor,176 a man was charged with assault in the 
second degree when he bit another man’s nose during a physical al-
tercation.177  The Nebraska judge instructed the jury that a “danger-
ous instrument is anything which, because of its nature and the man-
ner and intention of its use, is capable of inflicting bodily injury.”178  
The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of the second de-
gree assault charge.179  Defense counsel objected to this interpretation 
of a “dangerous instrument,” arguing to replace the word “anything” 
with the word “object,” but the court overruled this objection.180  On 
appeal, the defendant challenged the jury instruction given during the 
trial, arguing that his teeth could not be considered the “anything” to 
sustain a conviction of second degree assault.181  Nevertheless, the 
appellate court reasoned that teeth are certainly capable of causing 
bodily injury.182  The court looked to the Michigan Court of Appeals 
for guidance, which had previously clarified that “[w]hat distin-
guished felonious assault . . . from simple assault and aggravated as-
sault is the use of a dangerous weapon in the perpetration of the as-
sault.”183  Thus, the court concluded that it would join the majority of 
jurisdictions, holding that neither teeth, nor body parts, fall within the 
category of “dangerous instruments.”184  Through this holding, the 
court sought to preserve the distinctions in the language of its assault 
statutes, and prevent the phrase “dangerous instrument” from becom-
ing meaningless.185 
 
175 Id. at 423. 
176 575 N.W.2d 625 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998). 
177 Id. at 627. 
178 Id. at 629. 
179 Id. at 630. 
180 Id. at 629. 
181 Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d at 629, 630 (observing that the defendant argued that since “his 
teeth are part of his body, they cannot be considered as a ‘dangerous instrument’ ” within the 
meaning of the statute); see NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-309 (1995) (“(1) A person commits the 
offense of assault in the second degree if he or she: (a) Intentionally or knowingly causes 
bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument; (b) Recklessly causes serious 
bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument.”). 
182 Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d at 630. 
183 Id. at 630 (quoting People v. Van Diver, 263 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)). 
184 Id. at 631; see also Davis, 406 N.E.2d 417; Owusu, 712 N.E.2d 1228; Van Diver, 263 
N.W.2d 370. 
185 Bachelor, 575 N.W.2d at 631-32. The court stated “[d]eclaring body parts dangerous 
instruments makes the increased penalty for using a dangerous instrument meaningless and 
creates ambiguity, if not outright duplication, between second and third degree assault under 
18
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Louisiana courts have long held that a person’s teeth or bare 
hands cannot be a dangerous weapon in the eyes of the law.186  In 
State v. Calvin,187 the court stated: 
It is true that portions of the human anatomy may be 
dangerous and the bare hands of a merciless assailant 
may quite readily ‘produce death or great bodily 
harm,’ particularly if the victim be young or weak, but 
the fact remains that there must be proof of the use of 
some inanimate instrumentality before a defendant can 
be held guilty of assault ‘with a dangerous weapon.’188 
As such, the court rejected any assertion to the contrary and required 
the use of an external instrumentality to sustain an aggravated charge 
with a dangerous weapon.189 
The Oregon legislature has defined a “dangerous weapon” as 
“any weapon, device, instrument, material or substance which under 
the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threat-
ened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physi-
cal injury.”190  In State v. Kuperus,191 the court reversed a first-degree 
assault conviction on the ground that teeth are not recognized as a 
dangerous weapon in Oregon.192  Pointing to the plain meaning of the 
statute, the court suggested that a “dangerous weapon” must be ex-
ternal to the human body.193  The court observed that the Oregon leg-
islature “intended to distinguish between assaults committed without 
the use of an object external to the human body that could be used to 
harm the victim and those assaults in which such an object is 
used.”194  The court construed a weapon as something a person could 
arm themselves with or fortify their body with for offensive purposes, 
 
Nebraska law.”  Id. at 632. 
186 State v. Calvin, 24 So.2d 467, 469 (La. 1945); State v. Clark, 527 So. 2d 542, 543 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988); see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2 (3) (West 2010) (defining a dangerous 
weapon as “any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, 
is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm”). 
187 24 So.2d 467 (La. 1945). 
188 Id. at 469. 
189 Id. 
190 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.015 (1) (West 2012). 
191 251 P.3d 235 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). 
192 Id. at 239.  The victim, in this case, lost part of his ear after the defendant bit it which 
left a visible scar.  Id.  The victim required a prosthetic device as a result.  Id. 
193 Id. at 237. 
194 Kuperus, 251 P.3d  at 238. 
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and since a person cannot “arm himself with his own body and parts 
thereof, including his teeth, his own teeth cannot be considered a 
dangerous weapon for purposes of first-degree assault.”195 
In Ojeda v. State¸196 the Texas court stated that “[a] hand or 
fist is not a deadly weapon per se, but may become a deadly weapon 
if used in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily inju-
ry.”197  The defendant in Ojeda beat his girlfriend with closed fists, 
causing facial fractures, a broken finger, and a loss of teeth in addi-
tion to other various injuries.198  The court affirmed the lower court’s 
finding that the defendant’s closed fist was used as a deadly weap-
on.199  In Najera v. State,200 a man with HIV was charged with aggra-
vated sexual assault after it was disclosed he knowingly engaged in 
unprotected sex.201 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s con-
viction and stated that a jury could have rationally concluded that the 
defendant used his penis and bodily fluids, knowingly and willingly, 
as a deadly weapon under the circumstances.202  Thus, Texas courts 
have concluded that it is for the jury to determine whether the body 
part was used as a deadly weapon by examining all of the evidence 
and the circumstances in which the body part was put to use.203  Un-
der this line of reasoning, the parts and fluids of a person’s body can 
be deemed deadly weapons in Texas if the evidence supports the ju-
rors’ conclusion.204 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in Plunkett held that a person’s body, more specifi-
cally a person’s mouth or teeth, cannot be deemed a dangerous in-
strument within the meaning of Penal Law section 10.00 (13) under 
 
195 Id. at 238-39. 
196 05-09-01343-CR, 2011 WL 3528189, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 12, 2011). 
197 Id. at *7; Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 1.07 (a) (17) (West 2010) (providing that a deadly weapon is “anything that in 
the manner of its use or intended us is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury”). 
198 Ojeda, 2011 WL 3528189 at *3. 
199 Id. at *1. 
200 955 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App. 1997). 
201 Id. at 701. 
202 Id. 
203 Ojeda, 2011 WL 3528189 at *7.  The evidence can include the words spoken by the 
defendant, the weapon’s intended use, the physical characteristics of the weapon, the severi-
ty of the injury, and the victim’s testimony among the factors to be considered.  Id. 
204 Id. at *8. 
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any circumstances.  This interpretation of the statute fails to take into 
consideration an important concern: the protection of the victim of 
such attacks.  There is a legitimate state interest in protecting law en-
forcement officials from the severe harm that can be inflicted upon 
them while performing their regular course of duty.  No greater harm 
can be posed to such an individual than harm from an aggressor who 
has nothing to lose, and often this is the scenario presented when of-
ficers of the law take action against criminals or prisoners, who often 
will resort to any possible measure to inflict harm upon another.  
When backed into a corner, and fighting for survival, an individual 
can, and will, resort to any measure necessary to protect their free-
dom, and this includes the use of one’s body. 
By declaring that a person’s body, as a matter of law, can 
never be a dangerous weapon, the New York courts take any prevail-
ing circumstances out of the jury’s hands.  Although there is a 
miniscule chance that diseases such as HIV can be transmitted via sa-
liva in a human bite, the court in Plunkett failed to recognize that 
when a struggle between two individuals occurs, the physicality may 
cause blood to be present in the aggressor’s mouth before the bite oc-
curs.  This would drastically increase the probability that a disease 
would in fact be contracted by the victim of a human bite, especially 
in vicious bites that break through layers of skin.205  Coupled with the 
intent to transfer said disease to the victim, the state should interpret 
the statute to encompass such situations, as HIV is most certainly 
deadly if contracted.  This intent could be demonstrated by a showing 
that the defendant in fact knew he was HIV positive at the time of an 
assault and by statements made expressing the desire to transmit the 
disease. Placing the focus on the aggressor’s intent to transfer a virus 
would eliminate concerns of placing increased liability on anyone 
with a transcommunicable disease.206  Of course, the burden would 
still remain on the People to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The public would be best protected by placing a focus on the intent to 
 
205 See Laura M. Maruschak & Randy Beavers, HIV in Prisons, 2007-08, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS – BULLETIN, 2 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/hivp08.pdf 
(noting that “New York was the only state to report more than 5% of its male custody popu-
lation and more than 10% of its female custody population with HIV or confirmed AIDS”). 
206 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Exceptions: The Criminal Law's Illogical Approach to HIV-
Related Aggravated Assaults, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 550, 553-54 (2011) (noting that sex-
ually active HIV positive individuals have been convicted of aggravated assault in the past 
even though they “had a good faith belief that they could not transmit the disease, had used 
protection, and had no intent to harm”). 
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harm with a particular item, rather than examining the characteristics 
of the instrument itself. 
A major concern of the courts is raising the culpability of the 
“extraordinary man”.  If a person is so “extraordinary” in physical 
stature, he or she should be on notice that his or her actions would 
cause serious physical injury to someone physically less fortunate.  
The minority view gives the jurors an opportunity to examine each 
case on a factual basis, and the jurors are more than capable to deter-
mine whether a simple fist fight between equals is different from a 
six-foot four, three-hundred pound man punching an elderly woman.  
Of course if the heavyweight fighter threatened a blow during the 
normal course of a fight, there could be no culpability, but the situa-
tion may be different if Mike Tyson threw an uppercut punch to the 
average citizen outside of the boxing profession.  If the facts indicate 
that the human body was not used as a dangerous weapon under the 
circumstances, the jury can convict the defendant on a lesser charge.  
A jury is often called upon to consider complicated issues in delibera-
tion, and it would not be an onerous task for the jury to take one’s 
size, weight, and strength into consideration while deliberating a 
charge. 
Many courts have held that innocuous items such as handker-
chiefs and belts could be considered dangerous weapons, whose nor-
mal purpose, or even secondary purpose, in no way suggests the abil-
ity to cause serious harm.  Items such as handkerchiefs, arm casts, 
belts and pit bulls have qualified as deadly weapons or dangerous in-
struments.  It is not a stretch of the imagination to consider the human 
body can have a significant ability to inflict harm upon another as a 
secondary purpose.  It would seem that the human body, in particular, 
one’s mouth and teeth, qualify under the statute more so than the ra-
ther innocuous items, particularly because one of the mouth’s prima-
ry purposes is biting. 
Similarly, the court in Plunkett places too much emphasis on 
the blurring of statutory lines.  The court asserts that an alternative 
holding would effectively eliminate simple assault charges since eve-
ry assault requires some action by the human body.  The court fails to 
consider that its holding leaves open the possibility that individuals 
fitted with prosthetic arms or legs could potentially face elevated 
charges if they were used to injure another.  In the future, improve-
ments in medical technology will further frustrate these artificial 
boundaries established in New York, as prosthetics will become more 
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similar to the human anatomy both functionally and aesthetically. 
The “use-oriented” approach appropriately resolves this problem by 
not declaring an item dangerous per se, but by empowering the jury 
to analyze the circumstances which gave rise to the injury, and how 
the otherwise innocuous item was transformed into a dangerous in-
strument or deadly weapon.  The court in Plunkett states that the 
measure of criminal liability should reflect the actual harm and not 
the potential to inflict harm.  The “use-oriented” approach does just 
that.  It measures the harm caused by an object not normally capable 
of inflicting such harm.  The human body alone is capable of causing 
severe physical injury, disfigurement, and even death.207  The statuto-
ry language does not explicitly exclude the human body from consid-
eration as a dangerous instrument. When the human body has the ca-
pacity to cause serious injury or death, coupled with the intent to do 
so, the perpetrator should be held to a higher level of culpability. 
However, if a defendant were to be convicted of aggravated 
assault, with his or her mouth or body constituting the dangerous in-
strument, there would likely be a valid defense of unconstitutionality 
under the current construction of New York Penal Law § 120.11.  
From an objective view, the ordinary person probably would not 
equate the plain meaning of the word “instrument” with the human 
body.  However, for the reasons preceding, New York legislature 
should amend its aggravating statutes to explicitly state that a per-
son’s body may be considered by the trier of fact when determining 
whether or not, under the circumstances, it was a dangerous instru-
ment.  New York legislature should also consider changing the word 
“instrument” to “weapon” if it intends to exclude the human body 
from satisfying aggravated charges.  The word “weapon” carries with 
it a connotation of some outside instrumentality, whereas the word 
“instrument” is more ambiguous.  Despite the court’s interpretation 
of what legislature intended the statute to mean, the face of the statute 
must provide fair notice.  Additional clarifying language would help 
provide the requisite notice to would-be offenders, promote con-
sistent application of the law and serve to protect the public interest. 
 
207 See James B. McArthur, As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/aids Epidemic and the 
Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 740 (2009) (comparing HIV in-
fected individuals to other handicaps and concluding that “[s]ociety has determined the pen-
alties that individuals should suffer if they permanently debilitate or blind another human 
being, and society should criminalize the transmission of HIV likewise”). 
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